Government and society
Parallel structure
Despite its size, the People’s Republic of China is organized along unitary rather than federal principles. Both the government and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP; Pinyin: Zhongguo Gongchan Dang; Wade-Giles romanization: Chung-kuo Kung-ch’an Tang), moreover, operate “from the top down,” arrogating to the “Center” all powers that are not explicitly delegated to lower levels. To run the country, the government and the CCP have established roughly parallel national bureaucracies extending from Beijing down to local levels. These bureaucracies are assisted by various “mass organizations”—e.g., trade unions, a youth league, women’s associations, and writers’ and other professional associations—that encompass key sectors of the population. These organizations, with their extremely large memberships, have generally served as transmission lines for communicating and uniformly implementing policies affecting their members. No voluntary associations are permitted to function that are wholly independent of CCP and government leadership.
The CCP and government bureaucracies themselves are organized along territorial and functional lines. The territorial organization is based on a number of administrative divisions, with both a CCP committee and a “people’s government” in charge of each. These territorial divisions include the national level in Beijing (the Center), 33 provincial-level units (4 directly administered cities, 5 autonomous regions, the Hong Kong and Macau special administrative regions, and 22 provinces, excluding Taiwan), some 330 prefectural bodies, more than 2,850 county-level entities, and numerous cities, towns, and townships. Some larger cities are themselves divided into urban wards and counties. This territorial basis of organization is intended to coordinate and lend coherence to the myriad policies from the Center that may affect any given locale.
The functionally based political organization is led on the government side by ministries and commissions under the State Council and on the CCP side by Central Committee departments. These central-level functional bodies sit atop hierarchies of subordinate units that have responsibility for the sector or issue area under concern. Subordinate functional units typically are attached to each of the territorial bodies.
This complex structure is designed to coordinate national policy (such as that toward the metallurgical industry), assure some coordination of policy on a territorial basis, and enable the CCP to keep control over the government at all levels of the national hierarchy. One unintended result of this organizational approach is that China employs more than 10 million officials—a number that exceeds the populations of many of the world’s countries.
There are tensions among these different goals, and thus a great deal of shifting has occurred since 1949. During the early and mid-1950s the government’s functional ministries and commissions at the Center were especially powerful. The Great Leap Forward, starting in 1958, shifted authority toward the provincial- and lower-level territorial CCP bodies. During the Cultural Revolution, starting in 1966, much of the political system became so disrupted that the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) was called in and assumed control. When the PLA fell under a political cloud, the situation became remarkably fluid and confused for much of the 1970s.
Since then the general thrust has been toward less-detailed CCP supervision of the government and greater decentralization of government authority where possible. But the division of authority between CCP and government and between territorial and functional bodies has remained in a state of flux, as demonstrated by a trend again toward centralization at the end of the 1980s and subsequent efforts toward decentralization since the late 1990s. The Chinese communist political system still has not become institutionalized enough for the distribution of power among important bodies to be fixed and predictable.
Constitutional framework
The fourth constitution of the People’s Republic of China was adopted in 1982. It vests all national legislative power in the hands of the National People’s Congress and its Standing Committee. The State Council and its Standing Committee, by contrast, are made responsible for executing rather than enacting the laws. This basic division of power is also specified for each of the territorial divisions—province, county, and so forth—with the proviso in each instance that the latitude available to authorities is limited to that specified by law.
All citizens 18 years of age and older who have not been deprived of their political rights are permitted to vote, and direct popular suffrage is used to choose People’s Congress members up to the county level. Above the counties, delegates at each level elect those who will serve at the People’s Congress of the next higher level. Were this constitution an accurate reflection of the real workings of the system, the People’s Congresses and their various committees would be critical organs in the Chinese political system. In reality, though, they are not.
Actual decision-making authority in China resides in the state’s executive organs and in the CCP. At the national level the top government executive organ is the State Council, which is led by the premier. The constitution permits the appointment of vice-premiers, a secretary-general, and an unspecified number of councillors of state and heads of ministries and commissions. The premier, vice-premiers, state councillors, and secretary-general meet regularly as the Standing Committee, in which the premier has the final decision-making power. This Standing Committee of the State Council exercises major day-to-day decision-making authority, and its decisions de facto have the force of law.
While it is not so stipulated in the constitution, each vice-premier and councillor assumes responsibility for the work of one or more given sectors or issues, such as education, energy policy, or foreign affairs. The leader concerned then remains in contact with the ministries and the commissions of the State Council that implement policy in that area. This division of responsibility permits a relatively small body such as the Standing Committee of the State Council (consisting of fewer than 20 people) to monitor and guide the work of a vast array of major bureaucratic entities. When necessary, of course, the Standing Committee may call directly on additional expertise in its deliberations. The National People’s Congress meets roughly annually and does only a little more than to ratify the decisions already made by the State Council.
Parallel to the State Council system is the central leadership of the CCP. The distribution of power among the various organs at the top of the CCP—the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau (Politburo), the Political Bureau itself, and the Secretariat—has varied a great deal, and from 1966 until the late 1970s the Secretariat did not function at all. There is in any case a partial overlap of membership among these organs and between these top CCP bodies and the Standing Committee of the State Council. In addition, formally retired elder members of the party have often exercised decisive influence on CCP decision making.
Political process
Role of the CCP
According to the CCP constitution of 1982, the National Party Congress is the highest decision-making body. Since the Party Congress typically convenes only once in five years, the Central Committee is empowered to act when the Congress is not in session. Further, the Political Bureau can act in the name of the Central Committee when the latter is not in session, and the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau guides the work of the Political Bureau. The Secretariat is charged with the daily work of the Central Committee and the Political Bureau. The general secretary of the party presides over the Secretariat and also is responsible for convening the meetings of the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee. The Secretariat works when necessary through several departments (the department for organization, for example, or the department for propaganda) under the Central Committee.
Until 1982 the CCP had a chairmanship that was unique among ruling communist parties. Mao Zedong held this office until his death in 1976, and Hua Guofeng was chairman until his removal from office in 1981. Hu Yaobang then served as party chairman until the post was abolished in 1982. The decision to redefine the position was part of the effort to reduce the chances of any one leader’s again rising to a position above the party, as Mao had done. China’s government still has a chairmanship, but the office has only limited power and is largely ceremonial.
The division of power among the leading CCP organs and between them and the State Council is constantly shifting. The Standing Committee of the Political Bureau and the Political Bureau as a whole have the authority to decide on any issue they wish to take up. The Secretariat has also at times played an extremely powerful and active role, meeting more frequently than either the Political Bureau or its Standing Committee and making many important decisions on its own authority. Similarly, the State Council has made many important decisions, but its power is always exercised at the pleasure of the CCP leadership.
Since the late 1970s China has taken a number of initiatives to move toward a more institutionalized system in which the office basically determines the power of its incumbent rather than vice versa, as has often been the case. Thus, for example, the CCP and state constitutions adopted in 1982 (and subsequently amended somewhat) for the first time stipulated a number of positions that confer membership status on the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. These positions are the head of the Party Military Affairs Commission, the general secretary of the CCP, the head of the Central Advisory Committee, and the head of the Central Discipline Commission. In addition, for the first time under the stipulations of the constitution, limits of two consecutive terms were placed on the government offices of premier, vice-premier, and state councillor. There were no similar constitutional restrictions on the tenure of incumbents to top CCP positions.
In theory, the CCP sets major policy directions and broadly supervises the implementation of policy to ensure that its will is not thwarted by the state and military bureaucracies. The CCP also assumes major responsibility for instilling proper values in the populace. The government, according to the theory, is responsible for carrying out CCP policy, making the necessary decisions as matters arise. Of course, this clear division of labor quickly becomes blurred for a number of reasons. For example, only since the late 1970s has a concerted effort been made to appoint different people to the key executive positions in the CCP and the government. Prior to that time, the same individual would head both the CCP committee and the government body in charge of any given area. At the highest levels the premier of the government and the chairman of the party continue to sit on the CCP Political Bureau.
More fundamentally, it is often impossible to clearly separate policy formation and implementation in a huge, complex set of organizations charged with a multiplicity of tasks. The tendency has been for CCP cadres to become increasingly involved in day-to-day operations of the government, until some major initiative was taken by the top national leadership to reverse the trend. While the distinction between the CCP and the government is of considerable significance, therefore, the ruling structure in China can also be viewed from the functional point of view mentioned above. The careers of individual officials may shift among posts in both the CCP and the government, but for most officials all posts are held within one area of concern, such as economics, organization or personnel, security, propaganda, or culture.
Administration
A hierarchy of organization and personnel has been embedded in virtually all CCP and government bodies. Even on the government side, all officials in these personnel departments are members of the CCP, and they follow rules and regulations that are not subject to control by the particular bodies of which they are formally a part. This system has been used to assure higher-level CCP control over the appointments to all key positions in the CCP, government, and other major organizations (enterprises, universities, and so forth).
For much of the period between 1958 and 1978, these personnel departments applied primarily political criteria in making appointments. They systematically discriminated against intellectuals, specialists, and those with any ties or prior experience abroad. From 1978 to 1989, however, official policy was largely the reverse, with ties abroad being valued because of China’s stress on “opening the door” to the international community. A good education became an important asset in promoting careers, while a history of political activism counted for less or could even hinder upward mobility. A partial reversion to pre-1978 criteria was decreed in 1989, followed by periods of shifting between the two policies.
Two important initiatives have been taken to reduce the scope of the personnel bureaucracies. First, during 1984 the leaders of various CCP and government bodies acquired far greater power to appoint their own staffs and to promote from among their staffs on their own initiative. The leaders themselves still must be appointed via the personnel system, but most others are no longer fully subject to those dictates. Second, a free labor market has been encouraged for intellectuals and individuals with specialized skills, a policy that could further reduce the power of the personnel bodies.
Justice
The legal apparatus that existed before the changes made during the Cultural Revolution was resurrected in 1980. The State Council again has a Ministry of Justice, and procuratorial organs and a court system were reestablished. The legal framework for this system was provided through the adoption of various laws and legal codes. One significant difference was that for the first time the law provided that there should be no discrimination among defendants based on their class origin. China also reestablished a system of lawyers.
The actual functioning of this legal apparatus, however, has continued to be adversely affected by a shortage of qualified personnel and by deeply ingrained perspectives that do not accord the law priority over the desires of political leaders. Thus, for example, when the top CCP leadership ordered a severe crackdown on criminal activity in 1983, thousands were arrested and executed without fully meeting the requirements of the newly passed law on criminal procedures. That law was subsequently amended to conform more closely with the actual practices adopted during the crackdown. Subsequently, similar campaigns have been mounted against criminal activity.
Security
The People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is the unified organization of all Chinese land, sea, and air forces. The history of the PLA is officially traced to the Nanchang Uprising of August 1, 1927, which is celebrated annually as PLA Day. The PLA is one of the world’s largest military forces, with in excess of two million members. Military service is compulsory for all men who attain the age of 18; women may register for duty in the medical, veterinary, and other technical services. Demobilized servicemen are carried in a ready reserve, which is reinforced by a standby reserve of veterans and by the militia.
The PLA is formally under the command of the Central Military Commission of the CCP; there is also an identical commission in the government, but it has no clear independent functions. The CCP commission is far more powerful than the Ministry of National Defense, which operates under the State Council, and it assures continuing CCP control over the armed forces. The political leadership has made a concerted effort to create a professional military force restricted to national defense and to the provision of assistance in domestic economic construction and emergency relief. This conception of the role of the PLA requires the promotion of specialized officers who can understand modern weaponry and handle combined arms operations. Troops around the country are stationed in seven military regions and more than 20 military districts. Despite the drive to modernize the PLA, limited military budgets and other constraints have caused the sophistication of conventional military armaments and of logistics and command-and-control systems to lag behind that of other major military powers.
The role of the Public Security forces of China began to change in the late 1970s. The definition and designation of what poses a threat to security, for example, were narrowed, and there was a decline in the scope of activities of the security forces. The practice of political suppression, the victims of which once numbered in the tens of millions, was reduced, and in the late 1970s a large (but unknown) number of people were released from labor or other camps run by the Public Security forces. Also, during the 1980s the “open-door” policy toward the outside world led to the adoption of a more-relaxed attitude by the Public Security forces regarding their efforts to control and restrict the activities of foreigners in China. From 1990, however, the trend was generally toward a stricter policy and tighter controls.
Specific organizational and policy initiatives also have affected the role of the Public Security forces. The trend toward creating a body of codified law and toward establishing a legal system that operates according to that law has in itself reduced the arbitrary power once exercised by the Public Security system. (By the 1970s that system had effectively acquired the power to arrest, convict, sentence, and detain any individual without interference from any other “outside” body.) The Public Security Ministry also has relinquished administrative control over counterespionage and economic crimes, which was transferred to a Ministry of State Security.
Health and welfare
The Chinese government faces a mammoth task in trying to provide medical and welfare services adequate to meet the basic needs of the immense number of citizens spread over a vast area. Although China’s overall affluence has grown dramatically since the mid-1980s—per capita income has increased many times over, and caloric intake has become comparable to that for western Europe—a great many of its people live at socioeconomic levels far below the national average. The medical system, moreover, labors under the tension of whether to stress quality of care or to spread scarce medical resources as widely as possible. In addition, there has been repeated debate over the relative balance that should be struck between the use of Western and traditional Chinese medicine. While the Cultural Revolution pushed the balance toward widespread minimum care with great attention paid to traditional medicine, policy after the late 1970s moved in the other direction on both issues; by the late 1980s the proportion of doctors of Western medicine had exceeded those of traditional practices. The Ministry of Public Health of the State Council oversees the health services system, which includes a substantial rural collective sector but almost no private sector. All the major medical facilities are run by the government.
The health of the Chinese populace has improved considerably since 1949. Average life expectancy has increased by about three decades and now ranks nearly at the level of that in advanced industrial societies. Many communicable diseases, such as plague, smallpox, cholera, and typhus, have either been wiped out or brought under control. In addition, the incidences of malaria and schistosomiasis have declined dramatically since 1949, and in 2021 the World Health Organization declared that malaria had been eliminated in China. However, in 2019, the highly contagious respiratory illness COVID-19 was first detected in Wuhan and rapidly spread throughout China and the world, giving rise to a multiyear pandemic that resulted in millions of deaths worldwide.
As evaluated on a per capita basis, China’s health facilities remain unevenly distributed. Only about half of the country’s medical and health personnel work in rural areas, where approximately three-fifths of the population resides. The doctors of Western medicine, who constitute about one-fourth of the total medical personnel, are even more concentrated in urban areas. Similarly, about two-thirds of the country’s hospital beds are located in the cities.
China has a health insurance system that provides virtually free coverage for people employed in urban state enterprises and relatively inexpensive coverage for their families. The situation for workers in the rural areas or in urban employment outside the state sector is far more varied. There are some cooperative health care programs, but their voluntary nature produced a decline in membership from the late 1970s.
The severest limitation on the availability of health services, however, appears to be an absolute lack of resources, rather than discrimination in access on the basis of the ability of individuals to pay. An extensive system of paramedical care has been fostered as the major medical resource available to most of the rural population, but the care has been of uneven quality. The paramedical system feeds patients into the more-sophisticated commune-level and county-level hospitals when they are available.
Changes in the leading causes of death reflect the longer life span and improved living conditions that have developed in China since 1949. For some time, the major causes have been pulmonary and cerebrovascular diseases, malignant tumors, and cardiac disease. Severe environmental pollution has become a major health hazard in several parts of the country.
Because a large proportion of what in the West would be considered public welfare obligations is in China the responsibility of factories, offices, and rural collectives and families, the real level of “welfare” spending and the strengths and weaknesses of the welfare system are difficult to gauge. However, statistical information gradually has become more available. The state provides pensions for retirees from state enterprises and official service, but this includes only a small percentage of the total workforce. The state’s welfare resources are heavily concentrated in the urban areas, where they include subsidies for housing, medical care, education, and some foods. In the cities the level of subsidized services, though, depends largely on the nature and conditions of the unit in which a person works. Unemployed individuals are typically taken care of by their working relatives, and all Chinese citizens have a legal obligation to care for their elderly parents. There is a small number of old-age homes for the elderly who have no children or other relatives to support them.
In the rural areas much of the responsibility for welfare was left to the local collective units, the resources of which have declined since the late 1970s as the collectives have been disbanded. Thus, the actual level of services now varies greatly depending on both the financial standing of the locality and the inclinations of the villagers. The Chinese government does allocate emergency relief to areas that have suffered from natural disasters (including crop failures). Generally, the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the State Council assumes primary responsibility for administering the government’s portion of China’s welfare system.
Education
The educational system in China is a major vehicle for both inculcating values in and teaching needed skills to its people. Traditional Chinese culture attached great importance to education as a means of enhancing a person’s worth and career. In the early 1950s the Chinese communists worked hard to increase the country’s rate of literacy, an effort that won them considerable support from the population. By the end of that decade, however, the government could no longer provide jobs adequate to meet the expectations of those who had acquired some formal schooling. Other pressing priorities squeezed educational budgets, and the anti-intellectualism inherent in the more-radical mass campaign periods affected the status and quality of the educational effort. These conflicting pressures made educational policy a sensitive barometer of larger political trends and priorities. The shift to rapid and pragmatic economic development as the overriding national goal in the late 1970s quickly affected China’s educational system.
The Chinese educational structure provides for six years of primary school, three years each of lower secondary school and upper secondary school, and four years in the standard university curriculum. All urban schools are financed by the state, while rural schools depend more heavily on their own financial resources. Official policy stresses scholastic achievement, with particular emphasis on the natural sciences. A significant effort is made to enhance vocational training opportunities for students who do not attend a university. The quality of education available in the cities generally has been higher than that in the countryside, although considerable effort has been made to increase enrollment in rural areas at all education levels.
The traditional trend in Chinese education was toward fewer students and higher scholastic standards, resulting in a steeply hierarchical educational system. Greater enrollment at all levels, particularly outside the cities, is gradually reversing that trend. Primary-school enrollment is now virtually universal, and nearly all of those students receive some secondary education; about one-third of lower-secondary graduates enroll in upper-secondary schools. The number of university students is increasing rapidly, though it still constitutes only a small fraction of those receiving primary education. For the overwhelming majority of students, admission to a university since 1977 has been based on competitive nationwide examinations, and attendance at a university is usually paid for by the government. In return, a university student has had to accept the job provided by the state upon graduation. A growing number of university students are receiving training abroad, especially at the postgraduate level.
The system that developed in the 1950s of setting up “key” urban schools that were given the best teachers, equipment, and students was reestablished in the late 1970s. The inherently elitist values of such a system put enormous pressure on secondary-school administrators to improve the rate at which their graduates passed tests for admission into universities. In addition, dozens of elite private schools have been established since the early 1990s in China’s major cities.
Six universities, all administered directly by the Ministry of Education in Beijing, are the flagships of the Chinese higher educational system. Three are located in Beijing: Peking University (Beijing Daxue), the leading nontechnical institution; Tsinghua (Qinghua) University, which is oriented primarily toward science and engineering; and People’s University of China, the only one of the six founded after 1949. The three outside Beijing are Nankai University in Tianjin, which is especially strong in the social sciences; Fudan University, a comprehensive institution in Shanghai; and Sun Yat-sen (Zhongshan) University in Guangzhou (Canton), the principal university of South China. In addition, every province has a key provincial university, and there are hundreds of other technical and comprehensive higher educational institutions in locations around the country. The University of Hong Kong (founded 1911) is the oldest school in Hong Kong.
The damage done to China’s human capital by the ravages of the Great Leap Forward and, especially, by the Cultural Revolution was so great that it took years to make up the loss. After the 1970s, however, China’s educational system increasingly trained individuals in technical skills so that they could fulfill the needs of the advanced, modern sector of the economy. The social sciences and humanities also receive more attention than in earlier years, but the base in those disciplines is relatively weak—many leaders still view them with suspicion—and the resources devoted to them are thin.